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Instrumental Calculation, Cognitive Role-Playing, or Both? Self-Perceptions of 
Seconded National Experts in the European Commission 
 
Zuzana Murdoch and Benny Geys 
 
ABSTRACT 
Most work studying micro-processes of integration – i.e. how agents develop identities and 
decision-making behaviours within a particular institution – offers explanations based on 
either instrumental rationality or socialisation. This article proposes a two-dimensional 
framework that allows analysing under which conditions both logics of social action co-exist. 
Our empirical analysis employs a unique dataset from a 2011 survey of all 1098 currently 
active Seconded National Experts (SNEs) in the European Commission. We find that a) 
instrumental cost-benefit calculation and cognitive role-playing (as semi-reflexive 
socialisation) often simultaneously influence SNEs’ (perceptions of their) behaviour, and b) 
this joint presence of both logics of social action depends on certain scope conditions (i.e., 
SNEs’ education, length of prior embeddedness and noviceness). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Substantive transformations in the European administrative space are generating a ‘New 
Executive Order’ in Europe (Trondal 2010). Amongst others, the rising use of compound 
procedures in decision-making and policy implementation (Thatcher 2005; Hofmann 2008) 
fills Europe’s administrative bodies with European and member-state bureaucrats, experts and 
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politicians. Besides raising issues of accountability and legitimacy (Curtin and Egeberg 2008; 
Hofmann 2008), this also leads to an increasing interplay of structures, identities and interests 
amongst and within bureaucratic staff, and blurs the boundaries of their organisational 
affiliation (Olsen 2002). Such blurred boundaries are not exclusive to the European 
administration. Similar transformation processes have been observed in other international 
organisations such as the UN, NATO, NAFTA or ASEAN (Kydd 2003; Johns 2007). 
 
This changing reality – i.e., (inter)national bureaucrats increasingly becoming servants of 
several masters (Johns 2007) – has implications for, and raises the importance of, research on 
bureaucrats’ organisational identities and what affects their decision-making behaviour (Bauer 
2012; Hooghe 2012). Traditionally, bureaucrats’ preferences or actions have often been 
assumed to either follow the norms and/or structural cues defining a given organisation, or to 
be guided by goals and cues brought by themselves to the situation (Johnston 2007; Trondal 
2007). However, empirical analyses based on either approach have been, at best, inconclusive 
(Hooghe 2002, 2005; Trondal 2010; Bauer 2012). Moreover, particularly in environments 
where ‘organizational boundaries that distinguish members from nonmembers are 
increasingly less transparent and knowable’ to all participants (Bartel and Dutton 2002: 115), 
the dichotomy between self-interest and socialisation is likely to become insufficient (Bauer 
2012; Hooghe 2012).  
 
Consequently, several scholars have taken up calls to abandon the ‘tyranny of dichotomies’ 
(Olsen 2009: 191) and allow for multiple logics of action to influence individuals’ preferences 
or actions. In such models, different logics of social action have been placed in a researcher-
imposed temporal order (Cowles et al. 2001; Schimmelfennig 2005), viewed as independent 
competing explanations (Bauer 2012) or assumed to drive individuals’ preferences under 
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specific conditions (Chong 2000; Hooghe 1999, 2000, 2002). Consequently, hypotheses are 
made as to the conditions under which one or the other logic of action gains the upper hand. 
Yet, in reality, it is hard to imagine people who are exclusively guided by, say, environmental 
expectations and are not affected by private rewards, or vice versa. In this article, we therefore 
focus on the counterpart to existing analyses, and assess under which conditions both logics of 
action co-exist (and thus simultaneously affect individuals).  
 
Analytically, we combine insights from two neo-institutionalist approaches – Organisation 
Theory and Rational Choice – to develop a theoretical framework resting on the social 
mechanisms of cognitive role-playing and instrumental calculation. While the former 
represents the effects of semi-reflexive socialisation (i.e. internalisation of behavioural roles 
created by formal organisational structures; Egeberg 2004; Checkel 2005), the latter stands for 
the effects of utility-maximising instrumental activity through evaluation of costs and benefits 
from given actions. We then calibrate the model using a number of scope conditions derived 
from the foregoing literature, which allows us to derive predictions that explicitly aim at 
identifying conditions under which both logics of social action simultaneously play a role. 
 
Empirically, we exploit a unique new survey administered between January and April 2011 to 
all 1098 currently active Seconded National Experts (SNEs) in the European Commission. 
Given the characteristics of secondment to the European Commission, this allows analysing 
individuals with a particularly strong interplay of structures, identities and interests. 
Moreover, as most studies of bureaucrats’ identities and decision-making behaviour analyse 
permanent officials (Hooghe 2005, 2012; Kassim et al. 2008; Bauer 2012), it also permits the 
analysis of a relatively neglected group of bureaucrats (see, however, Trondal et al. 2008; 
Trondal 2010). The findings, based on a sample of 452 SNEs, first of all show that 
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instrumental calculation and cognitive role-playing often simultaneously define how SNEs 
perceive their decision-making. This suggests that theoretical approaches positing them as 
mutually exclusive miss important aspects of how agents develop identities and decision-
making behaviours within a particular institution. Second, this simultaneity depends, in line 
with theoretical predictions, on specific conditions (i.e., SNEs’ education, length of prior 
embeddedness and noviceness). 
 
The next section develops our theoretical argument and discusses its testable implications. 
The subsequent section contains the empirical analysis, while a final section summarizes our 
main findings and presents some avenues for further research.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Choice and commensurability of theories 
A priori, any attempt to bring together instrumental action – driven by the consequentialist 
logic of optimising individuals (March and Olsen 1989) and central to rationalist theories – 
and socialisation – driven by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 2006) and a key 
concept of constructivist theories – is challenged by the underlying (meta)theories’ 
ontological and epistemological differences. One way to bridge this divide is to search for 
terms that are mutually translatable, i.e. commensurable, to both frameworks. While this is, 
per definition, impossible at the level of abstract meta-theories, ‘finding ways to understand 
each other’ is more realistic in the empirically-oriented perspective of middle-range theories 
(Jupille et al., 2003: 17-18; Zürn and Checkel, 2005). Following this view, our model draws 
on Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Organisation Theory. Although there obviously 
are crucial differences between both theories, we will argue that a theoretical dialogue 
between them is feasible as they concur on the general concept of strategic optimising; more 
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specifically, while in Organisation Theory this optimising refers to the strategic design of the 
organisational structure in order to trigger desirable behavioural roles, in RCI it relates to 
actors’ strategic use of those roles. 
 
RCI, one of the approaches under the umbrella of Rational Choice Theory, shares this theory’s 
core assumptions of methodological individualism, utility-maximisation and recognition of 
institutional and/or strategic constraints on individual choice. Especially the latter two 
assumptions are critical for our analysis. First, while an individual is always viewed as driven 
by cost/benefit calculations (i.e. ‘logic of consequentiality’; March and Olsen 1989), the 
concept of utility need not be materialist; utility can also be of immaterial nature (Ferejohn 
1991; Johnston 2001) and derive from, for instance, social standing and/or influence 
(Schimmelfennig 2002). Second, while individual instrumental action in RCI is understood to 
be constrained or ‘bounded’ by the environment, these constraints can be of social, 
institutional and/or material character (Granovetter 1985). Life in a social environment, for 
example, constrains agents by the scripts and consistency requirements of their roles (or 
‘framework of appearances’; Goffman 1959: 242). Crucially, however, given the 
consequentialist logic underlying behaviour, these constraints (i.e. roles’ fundamental rules) 
are seen as ‘resources for strategies’ which can be used to one’s advantage (Edgerton 1985: 
12-14); thus leading rational agents to engage in ‘impression management’ (Goffman 1959: 
238). RCI thus allows for the possibility that normative and/or cognitive-cultural structures 
influence individual actions, and that agents strategically use the roles embedded in such 
structures to achieve, preserve or increase their standing and/or influence (Schimmelfennig 
2002). 
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Organisation Theory posits that identities and behaviours of organisational actors are not only 
defined, but also (de)activated, by specific organisational structures. Structures act as a 
complexity-reducing mechanism: they deconstruct complex tasks into sub-tasks that can be 
carried out within relatively independent units of governance (Egeberg 2004). In essence, 
institutions are viewed as normative constructions that shape the understanding, behaviour 
and preferences of agents, while agents ‘play a role’ defined by the organisational structures. 
Hence, the organisation’s formal design triggers individuals’ actions and identities because it 
induces appropriation of its preferred behavioural role expectations through a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 2006). Consequently, identities and decision-making 
behaviour can easily be (re)moulded through redesigning structural characteristics (Egeberg 
2004), which implies that Organisation Theory allows conceptualisation of strategic 
optimising of institutional structures. 
 
From this discussion, it is clear that Organisation Theory concurs with RCI on the general 
concept of strategic optimising; with the crucial difference that RCI refers to actors’ strategic 
use of relevant roles while Organisation Theory refers to the strategic design of organisational 
structures. Hence, while the unit of analysis is different, the concept of strategic optimising is 
commensurable. This establishes that there are fruitful assumptive openings within both 
theories to conduct a carefully constructed dialogue (Jupille et al., 2003), and implies the 
feasibility of a (limited) incorporative approach that results in a two-dimensional framework 
incorporating both underlying logics of social action (i.e., instrumental action and 
socialisation). Still, given the rationalist nature of the concept of strategic optimising, it is 
important to note that we thereby do not impose a rationality requirement at the level of 
individuals’ decision-making or identity-formation within institutional structure(s). Indeed, 
both instrumental cost-benefit calculators (i.e., the RCI perspective) and role-enactors (i.e., 
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the Organisation Theory perspective) can either be fully structurally determined or retain a 
possibility to choose their actions depending on the constraints of the ‘choice architecture’ 
they face (Hollis and Smith 1994). That is, structures can be so strong that both rational 
choice and role-playing leave the actor only one option, or they can be so indeterminate that 
rational agents and role-players retain some scope for choosing their actions. The central 
question, however, is how they choose their actions – by maximizing utility or through logic 
of appropriateness, or both? 
 
Operationalisation and hypotheses 
We now particularise the theoretical framework by identifying two social mechanisms, each 
corresponding to its relevant social theory of action.  
i) The mechanism of instrumental calculation (theory of rational action; Checkel 2005; 
Johnston 2005) is defined as an agent’s explicit evaluation of the social influence that can be 
gained from their decision-making behaviour. In other words, agents assess the influence 
that can be gained from their decisions, and settle on those most likely to aid in the pursuit of 
their private goals and improve their personal benefit (Johnston 2001, 2005; 
Schimmelfennig 2002). Below, we measure it via SNEs’ explicit aim to further their future 
career possibilities.  
ii) The mechanism of cognitive role-playing (theory of practical action; Powell and DiMaggio 
1991) is invoked to capture how actors enact organisation-specific roles with a degree of 
automaticity. The Commission is formally organised along two primary principles (purpose 
and process) and one secondary (territory) – each with corresponding relevance criteria for 
role expectations (Egeberg, 2006; Trondal et al. 2008).1 Hence, its bureaucrats are guided to 
act departmentally (defined by ‘administrative rules and procedures codified in portfolios’; 
i.e. department or unit representative), epistemically (defined by ‘professional expertise’; i.e. 
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as an independent expert), or according to territorially defined logics of behaviour (i.e. 
national or supranational; e.g., representative of the Commission as a whole) (Trondal, 2006: 
148). Consequently, and following Trondal (2006), we operationalise the cognitive role-
playing mechanism via these four behavioural roles: epistemic, sectoral, national and 
supranational.  
 
Having defined (and operationalised) the two main social mechanisms, we finally calibrate 
the model by considering under which conditions both mechanisms jointly – though not 
necessarily equally strongly – play a role in explaining bureaucrat’s decision-making 
behaviour.2 Such introduction of (four) scope conditions can here be interpreted as placing 
actors’ behaviour on a continuum, rather than dichotomy, between both underlying logics of 
social action. Note, however, that reference to such continuum reflects the idea that the 
explanatory power of both mechanisms and their underlying logic of social action lies away 
from the extreme points (i.e. neither obtains 0% or 100% explanatory power). It does not 
imply that we collapse both concepts into a one-dimensional space where higher absolute 
importance of one mechanism must be accommodated by lower absolute importance of the 
other. Instead, their relative importance can vary even though both mechanisms increase, or 
decrease, in absolute importance. 
 
Scope Condition 1: Autonomy from domestic institutions 
Organisation Theory suggests that embeddedness in current structures can override 
(pre)socialisation from previous structures because current structures are more prevalent than 
previous ones (Egeberg 2004). Yet, in practice, this principle of ‘organisational recency’ is 
dependent on the agent’s age (Johnston 2005), consistency of the effects of current structures 
over time (see below) and pre-supposes a clear separation of primary and secondary 
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affiliations. The latter, however, is not the case for SNEs. As they work for the Commission 
while being paid by their home governments (more details on the secondment process below), 
there is no clear separation of primary and secondary affiliations. When the boundaries of 
one’s organisational affiliation become blurred in this way, the influence of current structures 
might be curtailed and may become open to individuals’ cost-benefit analysis of various 
available roles. If so, individuals’ behaviour can become guided both by organisational role 
expectations and instrumental calculations. 
 
To assess this possibility, we look at SNEs’ actual (rather than legal and formal) autonomy 
from their domestic administration during secondment. Specifically, the principle of 
‘organisational recency’ predicts that the more autonomous SNEs are from their home 
administration during secondment, the less relevant home administrations’ behavioural role 
expectations become. This, clearly, need not entail that SNEs directly start following 
Commission’s role expectations. It might also imply a more central role for the pursuit of 
individual career options. As autonomy from domestic institutions thus allows greater leeway 
for Commission’s role expectations and/or individual’s career pursuits to shape SNEs’ 
decision-making, we obtain two distinct predictions. First, when autonomy strengthens the 
effect of Commission’s role expectations on SNEs’ decision-making, it will do so against the 
background of persisting rational calculations. Hence, larger autonomy increases the 
probability that Commission’s role expectations and instrumental calculations jointly affect 
SNE decision-making. Second, the reduced relevance of home administrations’ behavioural 
role expectations directly decreases the probability that such role expectations and 
instrumental calculations jointly affect SNE decision-making (since, obviously, one element 
of such tandem becomes less prevalent). Hence, our first hypothesis is: 
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SH1: Greater autonomy from domestic organisation increases (decreases) the likelihood that 
Commission’s (home administration’s) behavioural role expectations and cost-benefit 
calculations jointly define SNEs’ decision-making behaviour. 
 
Scope Condition 2: Education 
Educational institutions are generally viewed as people’s first and most intense period of 
socialisation (Hooghe 2005; Johnston 2005; Zürn and Checkel 2005). In the case of SNEs, 
one can expect that the nature and institution(s) of their education give them access to 
professional ‘enclaves’ within international institutions (Egeberg 2004: 8). This might not 
only facilitate their adoption of specific behavioural roles, but can also increase their 
awareness of the social and personal value of certain decision-making behaviours from a 
career-perspective. In other words, education supplies SNEs with initial socialising and 
strategic short-cuts that are central for their socialisation into, and their instrumental 
evaluation of, behavioural role expectations. Crucial, however, is whether or not education 
moulds SNEs in line with European or national identities and behaviour, whereby the former 
(latter) is likely to increase the effect of Commission’s (home country’s) behavioural role 
expectations (Hooghe 2005). Moreover, as internationally educated people may have a wider 
range of career options, career-related cost-benefit calculations may play a more prominent 
role than for nationally educated individuals; suggesting that the above-described effects will 
be stronger for bureaucrats with an international education. Hence, we hypothesise that:  
 
SH2: More ‘international’ (‘national’) education increases the likelihood that Commission’s 
(domestic institution’s) behavioural role expectations and SNEs’ cost-benefit calculations 
jointly define SNEs’ decision-making behaviour. The effect is stronger for ‘international’ 
education compared to ‘national’ education. 
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Scope Condition 3: Length of domestic embeddedness 
As indicated above, for current structures to override the pre-socialisation effects of previous 
structures requires consistency of their effects over time (Egeberg 2004; Hooghe 2005). 
Length of embeddedness within both structures is thereby a crucial factor (Hooghe 2005).3 
Specifically, longer full and continuous affiliation to previous primary structures makes those 
behavioural role expectations stickier and harder to dislodge. The resulting strengthening of 
the importance of domestic role expectations in SNEs’ decision-making behaviour makes that 
any current process of shaping their decision-making will be – at least – susceptible to, and – 
at most – driven by, instrumental calculations. In other words, for SNEs with longer affiliation 
to their domestic structures, the adoption of Commission’s behavioural role expectations is 
more likely to go together with instrumental motivations. If, however, role expectations from 
the current structures fail to re-define decision-making behaviour, the resulting dominance of 
domestic role expectations also precludes a role for cost-benefit calculations. Consequently, 
we hypothesise that: 
 
SH3: Longer previous embeddedness in domestic organisations increases (decreases) the 
likelihood that Commission’s (domestic institution’s) behavioural role expectations arises 
jointly with SNEs’ cost-benefit calculations. 
 
Scope Condition 4: Noviceness 
Being a novice – or having no prior relevance criteria to draw upon – can lead employees to 
be more ready to mimic old hands’ behaviour and be more susceptible to a new organisation’s 
behavioural role expectations (Johnston 2001; Hooghe 2005). As cost-benefit calculations 
always maintain some role in our setting, this implies that the Commission’s behavioural role 
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expectations are most likely to have decisive effects on shaping decisions of those SNEs who 
are novices, while the effect of instrumental cost-benefit calculations will be relatively less 
relevant. With experience, the latter may come to play a more substantial role as individuals 
not only learn any given institutions’ role expectations, but also when and how they can make 
strategic use of such expectations. That is, experienced SNEs gain the ability to strategically 
use their knowledge to engage in impression management (Goffman 1959; Schimmelfennig 
2002). Hence, we hypothesise that: 
SH4: Noviceness decreases the likelihood that behavioural role expectations and cost-benefit 
calculations jointly define SNEs’ decision-making behaviour. 
 
We present a visual rendition of the model in Figure 1. The continuum between both social 
mechanisms, which represents the central feature of our model, is presented by the black, 
boldface bidirectional arrow. The probability of SNEs being located along this continuum, 
predicted to depend on our four scope conditions (indicated at the figure’s left-hand side), will 
be analysed in the empirical section below. 
________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
________________ 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data 
The empirical analysis concerns national experts seconded to the European Commission on 
temporary (maximum four years) contracts. During secondment, these bureaucrats (SNEs) 
remain permanent and fully paid employees of their home administrations, but are formally 
required to ‘behave solely with the interest of the Commission in mind’ (Commission 2008, 
Art. 7:1a). What the latter statement implies, however, is less than clear. Indeed, being non-
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statutory staff, SNEs are not legally bound by the Commission’s usual employment contract 
or the obligations and benefits of its staff regulations, and the relevant corpus of rights and 
regulations is entrenched in a set of decisions that is only partially published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union. As connections between SNEs and their Member State of 
origin are recognised and accepted up to a point by the host institution during secondment, 
and SNEs must be taken back by their home institution after secondment, this creates 
substantial ambiguities regarding SNEs’ institutional boundaries. These ambiguities are 
important, as they can weaken the automaticity of relevant role enactment and allow for the 
simultaneous influence of instrumental calculation. Moreover, prior to their secondment, 
SNEs often obtain formal and informal briefings about life and work during and after 
secondment to the Commission (Norwegian government 2008; Trondal et al. 2008). These 
briefings prepare them for the Commission’s behavioural expectancies as well as inform them 
about secondment’s network and career value before their own posting. Clearly, this may 
further weaken the automaticity of relevant role enactment. 
 
The dataset derives from a survey administered between January and April 2011 to all 1098 
currently active SNEs in the European Commission. We received 667 responses, representing 
a response rate of just over 60%. After removing respondents lacking all information 
necessary for the analysis, the final sample contains 452 respondents (or just over 41% of the 
total SNE population). Although background characteristics for all 1098 SNEs were 
unavailable to us, this sample appears quite representative. Respondents cover 32 nationalities 
(with France, Italy and Germany each representing 6-7% of the sample) and display a 
reasonable gender (40.4% female) and age distribution (no age group represents more than 
6.7% of the sample, and about 55% is between 33 and 47 years old). These numbers very 
closely match the distribution of Commission permanent staff at the AD level with respect to 
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age (53% between the age of 33 and 47), gender (40.3% female) and nationality (e.g., Italy, 
France and Germany represent 4.8%, 5.6% and 5.6%, respectively, of Commission AD-level 
staff).4 As there is no reason to assume that SNEs are substantially different from permanent 
Commission staff in these respects, this suggests our sample is quite representative of the 
overall SNE population. Concerning their institutional background, it should be noted that 
SNEs are over-represented in policy-intensive areas (such as Health or Trade) compared to 
administrative areas (such as Human Resources), which is likewise reflected in our sample. 
Finally, our respondents are fairly evenly spread across the 4-year SNE-term (34% in their 
first year, 18%, 27% and 21% in years two, three and four, respectively).  
 
Empirical model 
To generate our dependent variable, we first recoded the raw data in terms of dichotomous 
constructs relating to utility-maximising cost-benefit calculation and cognitive role-playing. 
Our first social mechanism – i.e. instrumental calculation – is measured based on respondents’ 
answer to ‘What were your reasons for becoming SNE?’. We thereby follow Chong (2000) 
and Hooghe (2005) by focusing on individuals’ career concerns. In our sample, 190 SNEs 
(35%) state they joined the Commission in order to ‘advance my career’. Career benefits from 
secondment thus clearly are perceived by many SNEs as an asset to be striven for, and SNEs 
are coded 1 on this variable if they belong to this group, 0 otherwise. 
 
Our second social mechanism – i.e. cognitive role-playing – is measured using respondents’ 
answer to: ‘In your daily work, to what extent do you feel you act as a representative of [the 
Commission/your country’s government]?’. Although the Commission is mainly organised 
along the principles of purpose and process (see note 1), the options provided focus on the 
principle of territory since this determines a national/supranational tension that is unique to 
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the Commission’s formal organisation (compared to national bureaucracies). The answer – 
provided on a six-point scale from ‘fully’ to ‘not at all’ (see Table 1) – thus captures the 
strength of SNEs’ national or European ‘attachment’ (Hooghe 2005: 874), and provides a 
measure for the (self-perceived) extent to which values, rather than utility-calculations, 
underlie SNEs’ decision-making behaviour (Trondal 2006, 2010). Strong European (national) 
attachment is thereby seen to support the structuring importance of Commission-specific 
(country-specific) behavioural roles on SNEs. SNEs are coded 1 if they ‘fully’, ‘very much’ 
or ‘fairly much’ feel like a representative of the Commission (their home country), 0 
otherwise (though all results are robust to coding only ‘fully’ or ‘very much’ answers as 1).5 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Jointly, these two variables allow us to code our central outcome variable: i.e. the 
combination of instrumental calculation with supranational/national role-playing. This 
variable – referred to as ‘Strat_Role’ below – obtains a value of 1 when both social 
mechanisms are present, 0 otherwise. SNEs with a non-zero coding thus are situated along the 
continuum between both mechanisms and are influenced by both underlying logics of social 
action, rather than at one of its extremes.6 Importantly, we analyse the Strategic 
calculation/Supranational role-playing and Strategic calculation/National role-playing 
combinations separately, since this allows a more detailed analysis of the conditions under 
which specific territorial roles co-exist alongside strategic calculations of social influence. 
Note also that the dichotomisation of both underlying variables implies that SNEs will either 
be at an extreme point or in the middle between both social mechanisms. An analysis using 
more fine-grained coding for the underlying variables would not retain this feature. However, 
this would induce significant methodological concerns with respect to, for instance, the exact 
 16 
functional form to be imposed on the connection between both mechanisms. To avoid such 
complications, we retain the simpler dichotomous constructs in the current analysis. It should 
be noted, however, that preliminary analyses employing the full 6-point scale of the cognitive 
role-playing variables induced qualitatively similar inferences. 
 
Then, we define measures for our four scope conditions. Specifically, we operationalise 
SNEs’ autonomy based on a self-evaluation of their contacts with the domestic administration 
– i.e. “While on secondment, how often do you have contacts with your home institution?’ – 
on a five-point scale from ‘very often’ (0) to ‘never’ (5) (objective data on SNEs’ contacts 
are, unfortunately, unavailable). We code education as ‘national’ when an SNE did not have 
any education abroad, while it is ‘international’ when (s)he had at least part of his/her 
education abroad (see also Hooghe 2005). Given that the maximum possible length of 
secondment contracts to the Commission equals four years, we code SNEs as having ‘strong’ 
primary, domestic embeddedness when they have held the post in their domestic institutions 
for at least four consecutive years (note that cut-offs at three, five or six years of domestic 
experience do not affect our findings). Finally, to asses the effect of noviceness, we include 
the number of years an SNE has been on secondment at the Commission (Hooghe 2005) and 
an indicator variable equal to one for those SNEs who have not been on secondment at the 
Commission before.  
 
Finally, we add several control variables to minimize potential missing variable bias. 
Particularly, we control for SNEs’ age (in years), gender (dummy equals 1 if male) and level 
of education (dummy equals 1 if PhD). Moreover, to account for potential shifts in SNEs’ 
behaviour in the final year of secondment – similar to final-term effects often observed in 
legislator’s behaviour (Besley and Case 1995) – we introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
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this is the SNE’s final year of secondment.7 This leads to the following regression model 
(with subscript i referring to SNEs). 
 
Strat_Rolei = α + β1 Autonomyi + β2 InternatEdui + β3 Primacyi + β4 Novicei 
+ β5 FirstSecondmenti + δ Controlsi + εi 
 
Where Strat_Role is vector comprising two elements: a) ‘Strat_Role (internat.)’ representing 
the combination of strategic calculation and supranational role-playing, and b) ‘Strat_Role 
(nat.)’ representing the combination of strategic calculation and national role-playing. The 
regression model is estimated separately for both these dependent variables. 
 
Results 
Table 2 summarizes our main results, using a logistic regression approach to accommodate 
the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable. In columns (1) and (4), we provide a 
baseline estimation using only the key variables of interest, while columns (2) and (5) add all 
control variables. In both cases, we cluster standard errors by SNEs’ country of origin to 
account for potential non-independence of responses deriving from the same country. In 
columns (3) and (6), however, we cluster standard errors by SNEs’ DG or service, to evaluate 
how robust our results are to the different distributional assumptions underlying such choices. 
Finally, column (7) assesses the robustness of our findings to a different operationalisation of 
the role-playing mechanism: i.e. based on the extent to which SNEs take the interests of the 
Commission/home institution into account when drafting proposals in their daily work (see 
note 5 for more details). Note that while table 2 directly assesses whether the co-existence of 
both logics of social action depends on certain scope conditions as hypothesised in SH1-SH4, 
it does not allow evaluating which social mechanism is the main driver of such effects. Hence, 
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in table 3, we look at both social mechanisms individually (effectively repeating the same 
analysis for ‘instrumental calculation’ and ‘cognitive role-playing’). 
 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
Our results first of all provide partial support for hypothesis SH1. Particularly, in table 2, we 
find that SNEs’ autonomy from domestic institutions is positively related to the joint presence 
of Commission’s behavioural role expectations and cost-benefit calculations, while it is 
negatively related to the joint presence of domestic institution’s behavioural role expectations 
and cost-benefit calculations. While the former fails to reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels throughout the analysis (columns (1) through (3)), the latter is consistently 
statistically significant well beyond the 99% confidence level (columns (4) through (6)). From 
table 3, we learn that these effects appear mostly driven by the fact that autonomous SNEs are 
significantly more likely to profess acting in line with Commission’s role expectations, and 
(statistically insignificantly) less in line with domestic institutions’ role expectations.  
 
With respect to hypothesis SH2, we find that the effect of an international education is 
positive and statistically significant in columns (1) through (3), while it fails to reach 
significance at conventional levels in columns (4) through (6). This is in line with hypothesis 
SH2 and suggests that while instrumental, career-oriented motivations are especially 
important for internationally educated SNEs, Commission’s behavioural role expectations 
simultaneously retain high relevance to their decision-making processes in their daily work. 
This is further substantiated in table 3, where columns (1) and (3) show a positive effect of 
international education on SNE’s career-oriented motivations and the importance of 
Commission’s role expectation, respectively (Note also that both effects are statistically 
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significant beyond the 90% confidence level when using one-tailed tests, which would be 
appropriate here given our directions predictions). 
 
The effect of SNEs’ length of domestic embeddedness (labelled ‘Primacy’) is negative in 
column (1), but statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Still, given that such length is 
critically constrained by SNEs’ age, it is important to control directly for age to avoid biased 
inferences. Columns (2) and (3) show that this is indeed essential. While SNEs’ age has a 
strong negative direct effect (we return to this below), controlling for it in the estimation 
makes the effect of SNEs’ home-institution embeddedness become stronger in terms of both 
the size of the coefficient estimate and its statistical significance.8 The effect itself is 
consistent with hypothesis SH3: i.e., for SNEs with longer affiliation to their domestic 
structures (i.e., beyond four years), the adoption of Commission’s behavioural role 
expectations is more likely to go together with instrumental motivations. The reason, 
however, does not appear to lie in the fact that longer embeddedness makes domestic 
behavioural role expectations stickier (Johnston 2001; Hooghe 2005) – as longer domestic 
embeddedness reduces the probability that domestic institution’s role expectations play an 
important role (column (2) of table 3). Instead, it appears that longer domestic embeddedness 
strongly increases the importance of instrumental cost-benefit calculations (column (2) of 
table 3). One potential explanation is that individuals with substantial domestic public-
administrative experience are better aware of when and how they can make strategic use of 
Commission’s role expectations. That is, these SNEs gain the ability to strategically use their 
knowledge to engage in impression management.  
 
Finally, table 2 indicates that the effect of previous secondment experience is not robust in 
terms of statistical significance across all estimations. However, SNEs in the early years of 
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their secondment (“Novice’) as well as young SNEs are more likely to be characterised by the 
presence of both social mechanisms. This effect holds for both Commission’s (in columns (1) 
through (3)) and domestic institution’s role expectations (in columns (4) through (6)) when 
regarding SNEs’ years of secondment experience, but only for Commission’s role 
expectations when regarding SNEs’ age. While the direction of these effects is at odds with 
our formulation of hypothesis SH4, these results tie in with Hooghe’s (2005: 871) finding that 
instrumental rationality ‘is most likely to trump socialisation when an individual’s career 
chances are at stake’. As adhering to Commission’s behavioural roles is required to gain 
access to useful contacts and legitimise future career demands, new and/or young SNEs – who 
are much more likely than older SNEs to have come to the Commission in a bid to boost their 
future career prospects (see also column (1) in table 3) – readily adjust to this ‘frame’ for, at 
least in part, instrumental reasons. As a result, it is ‘novices’ rather than ‘old hands’ who 
appear more concerned with, and active in, impression management. 
 
As these results are robust to various extensions and alternative specifications (see above), 
they strongly support the existence of conditions under which both instrumental cost-benefit 
calculation and cognitive role-playing simultaneously influence SNEs’ (perceptions of their) 
decision-making behaviour. This substantiates our theoretical framework’s postulation of a 
continuum, rather than dichotomy, between both underlying logics of social action. Clearly, 
the existence of such continuum is established by the presence of SNEs for which our central 
outcome variable is coded as 1. Yet, the analysis additionally describes condition(s) under 
which this is most likely to take place. While supportive of our theoretical model, these 
findings are also intuitively reasonable and suggest a richer, and arguably more realistic, 
understanding of human behaviour that is likely to be especially relevant when multiple 
institutional affiliations make institutions’ effects upon actors more ambiguous. While such 
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multiplicity of structures, identities and interests lies at the heart of secondment processes 
analysed here, the increasing complexity of decision-making processes across many 
international institutions (see introduction) also gives it more general relevance. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Taking up the call to abandon the ‘tyranny of dichotomies’ (Olsen 2009: 191), various 
scholars have in recent years analysed individuals’ preferences or behaviour from a 
perspective that allows for a multiplicity of logics of social action (Chong 2000; Hooghe 
2002; Cowles et al. 2001; Schimmelfennig 2005; Bauer 2012). In general, however, such 
models have aimed to establish conditions under which one logic of action takes precedence 
over the other(s). In this article, we provided a complementary perspective and focused on the 
conditions under which both instrumental cost-benefit calculation and behavioural role 
criteria (indicating semi-reflexive socialisation) simultaneously affect (micro)integration 
processes – and multiple logics of social action thus co-exist.  
 
While taking one further step towards solving the puzzle of agents’ micro-level integration, 
our analysis remains open to a number of extensions. From a theoretical point of view, we do 
not account for the roles of persuasion (Risse 2004; Abdelal et al. 2009) or mimicking9 – and 
extensions including these factors should be important aims for future research. From an 
empirical point of view, incorporating a longitudinal research design would allow important 
insights into the determinants of the process of identity change, while moving beyond 
dichotomous measures would allow more detailed analyses of exact placements and/or 
movements along the proposed continuum. Also, as all previous work in this field, we rely on 
survey-based evidence. As this constrains the analysis to individuals’ self-perceptions of their 
behaviour, the link to actual decision-making would be fascinating to explore in future 
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research. One possible approach to fill this gap would be to assess whether different 
motivations come to the fore under different types of decisions or in different decision 
contexts (e.g., in crisis situations, or when there is a conflict between the position of the 
SNE’s Member State and that of the Commission). Finally, SNEs are subject to different 
operational rules and have different career plans and time horizons compared to permanent 
officials in the Commission. This creates a particular incentive structure, and future research 
should analyse whether our results also hold for permanent bureaucratic staff. 
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NOTES 
1  On the principle of purpose, the Commission is sectorally divided into Directorate 
Generals (DGs). This specialisation activates patterns of co-operation and conflict among 
DGs along sectoral (i.e. departmental) cleavages (Egeberg 2006) and triggers portfolio 
(sector), DG and unit identities, roles and decision-making behaviour in employees 
(Trondal et al. 2008). The Commission’s principle of process – such as administration, 
legal service, personnel service, and so on – encourages horizontal integration of functional 
departments, which induces departmental and epistemic (i.e. independent expert) identities, 
roles and decision-making behaviour. Finally, the secondary principle of territory 
introduces territorially defined logics of behaviour (i.e. national and supranational). 
2  While these are specific to the empirical application (i.e. Seconded National Experts in 
European Commission; see below), the theoretical argument itself has broader 
applicability. It could also be employed in studies assessing, for instance, the trust-
generating capacity of civic engagement or identity formation in urban gangs or rebel 
factions in civil wars (Jeffrey Checkel and Michael Zürn, personal communication, 
May/June 2009). 
3 Next to length, intensity is often argued to be essential. As SNEs work full-time in the 
Commission during secondment, we do not differentiate length and intensity. 
4 ‘AD’ refers to individuals at the level of administrators/advisors and higher. This is the 
most relevant comparison group since SNEs’ positions are generally equivalent to AD-
level positions. For more details on Commission permanent staff, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/figures/index_en.htm. 
5 One could argue that ‘acting as a Commission/country representative’ not fully captures 
the importance of behavioural role expectations. To check the robustness of our results to 
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the choice of this particular question, we ran the same analysis using the question ‘When 
putting forward a proposal, how much emphasis do you put on the best interests of [your 
home country/the Commission]’? The findings using this alternative measure leave our 
main inferences unaffected (see Table 2 below; full details upon request). 
6 Clearly, when the dependent variables have value 0, it may be that one of the two 
underlying variables has value 1. To evaluate whether this ‘intermediate’ group affects our 
findings, we re-ran the analysis excluding all 65 SNEs for which only one social 
mechanism is present. This leaves our findings qualitatively unaffected. 
7 We experimented with additional control variables including indicator variables for the 
number of postings an SNE had during his/her current secondment, whether or not his/her 
work portfolio matched his/her home-country experience, or whether (s)he perceives to 
work in a politically sensitive area. As these failed to generate significant results, and did 
not affect the findings reported below, we present the more parsimonious version of the 
model here. 
8 This is not driven by the slight reduction in the sample size due to adding our control 
variables. Indeed, replicating the analysis in columns (1) and (4) for same sample as in 
columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) provides the same results as those reported in columns (1) and 
(4). 
9 Mimicking differs from rational, strategic adaptation in the sense that there is no means-
end calculation involved. In fact, the ‘end’ itself would be uncertain as it occurs when one 
does not yet have an idea of what rewards might be reaped. Yet, it differs from cognitive 
role-playing in that it is not solely driven by institutional structures (Johnston 2005). 
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Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Commission SNEs acting as representative of Commission/country 
 Fully Very 
much 
Fairly 
much 
Fairly little Very little Not at all 
Country 
representative 
0.9% 3.1% 12.4% 28.7% 23.4% 31.6% 
Commission 
representative 
19.0% 34.7% 33.6% 8.2% 3.1% 1.5% 
Note: Data from authors’ own 2011 survey; N=452; Question: “In your daily work, to what extent do you feel 
you act as a representative of [the Commission/your country’s government]?’. Answers provided on a six-
point scale from ‘fully’ to ‘not at all’.  
 
INSTRUMENTAL 
CALCULATION 
ROLE-PLAYING 
(PERCEPTIONS OF) 
DECISION-MAKING 
BEHAVIOUR 
Autonomy 
Length of 
domestic 
embeddedness 
Education 
Noviceness 
Table 2: Baseline Estimation Results 
 (1) 
Strat_Role 
(internat.) 
(2) 
Strat_Role 
(internat.) 
(3) 
Strat_Role 
(internat.) 
(4) 
Strat_Role 
(nat.) 
(5) 
Strat_Role 
(nat.) 
(6) 
Strat_Role 
(nat.) 
(7) 
Strat_Role 
(interest) 
Autonomy 
(5-point home-country contact scale 
from ‘very often’ (0) to ‘never’ (5)) 
0.090 
(1.02) 
0.067 
(0.67) 
0.059 
(0.62) 
-0.519 *** 
(-4.34) 
-0.595 *** 
(-4.35) 
-0.593 *** 
(-5.26) 
0.058 
(0.54) 
Internat. Education 
(dummy) 
0.553 ** 
(2.08) 
0.676 * 
(1.88) 
0.647 *** 
(2.90) 
-0.049 
(-0.13) 
0.058 
(0.14) 
0.062 
(0.14) 
0.594 * 
(1.72) 
Primacy 
(1 if <4 years at home institution) 
-0.078 
(-0.33) 
-0.624 ** 
(-2.48) 
-0.639 ** 
(-2.18) 
0.178 
(0.73) 
0.068 
(0.28) 
0.070 
(0.25) 
-0.221 
(-0.82) 
Novice 
(year of secondment) 
-0.119 ‡ 
(-1.48) 
-0.287 ** 
(-2.50) 
-0.300 *** 
(-2.69) 
-0.086 
(-1.12) 
-0.199 ‡  
(-1.47) 
-0.197  
(-0.97) 
-0.229 ** 
(-2.06) 
First secondment 
(dummy) 
-0.820 ** 
(-2.34) 
-0.739 * 
(-1.87) 
-0.736 
(-1.39) 
0.237 
(0.44) 
0.348 
(0.61) 
0.348 
(0.78) 
-0.317 
(-0.88) 
Male 
(dummy) 
- 0.514 ** 
(2.01) 
0.499 ** 
(2.28) 
- -0.646 *** 
(-3.04) 
-0.643 ** 
(-2.30) 
-0.118 
(-0.40) 
Age 
(years) 
- -0.067 *** 
(-4.97) 
-0.067 *** 
(-4.94) 
- 0.021 
(1.25) 
0.021 
(1.41) 
-0.041 *** 
(-2.79) 
PhD 
(dummy) 
- -0.383 * 
(-1.79) 
-0.369 
(-1.05) 
- 0.225 
(0.90) 
0.244 
(0.43) 
0.205 
(0.68) 
Final year of secondment 
(dummy) 
- 1.186 *** 
(3.03) 
1.225 *** 
(3.72) 
- 0.500 
(0.81) 
0.496 
(0.78) 
0.911 ** 
(2.41) 
Intercept -0.825 ** 
(-2.13) 
2.280 *** 
(3.48) 
2.339 *** 
(3.28) 
-0.117 
(-0.28) 
-0.345 
(-0.40) 
-0.352 
(-0.33) 
0.711 
(0.78) 
Wald chi2 
N 
23.03 *** 
452 
114.16 *** 
417 
93.94 *** 
416 
21.44 *** 
452 
37.61 *** 
417 
92.19 *** 
416 
39.53 *** 
417 
Note: Dependent variable is Strat_Role (1 if both instrumental calculation and cognitive role-playing are present). In columns (1) through (3) the role-playing 
mechanism is measured using information on SNEs’ acting as “representative of the Commission’, while in columns (4) through (6) it uses “representative of my 
national government’. In column (7), role-playing is measured using information on the “emphasis SNEs put on Commission interest when putting forward a 
proposal’ (see also note 8). In all cases, t statistics based on standard errors corrected for country-level clustering between brackets (except in Columns (3) and (6)), 
where we cluster at the DG-level), *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% and ‡at 15%. Wald Chi2 attests to the joint significance of all variables in the model. 
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Table 3: Separate Results for each Social Mechanism 
 (1) 
Career 
(2) 
Nat. Role 
(3) 
Internat. Role 
Autonomy 
(5-point home-country contact scale 
from ‘very often’ (0) to ‘never’ (5)) 
0.014 
(0.16) 
-0.074 
(-1.09) 
0.434 *** 
(5.38) 
Internat. Education 
(dummy) 
0.538 ‡ 
(1.47) 
-0.262 
(-1.13) 
0.327 
(1.36) 
Primacy 
(1 if <4 years at home institution) 
-0.562 ** 
(-2.33) 
0.380 * 
(1.69) 
-0.061 
(-0.30) 
Novice 
(year of secondment) 
-0.242 *** 
(-2.68) 
0.052 
(0.52) 
0.075  
(0.98) 
First secondment 
(dummy) 
-0.805 ** 
(-2.47) 
0.070 
(0.19) 
-0.253 
(-0.73) 
Male 
(dummy) 
0.330 
(1.31) 
-0.182 
(-0.96) 
0.371 ** 
(2.25) 
Age 
(years) 
-0.065 *** 
(-4.71) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.012 
(-0.98) 
PhD 
(dummy) 
-0.208 
(-0.81) 
0.296 
(1.21) 
0.094 
(0.44) 
Final year effect 
(dummy) 
0.776 ** 
(2.30) 
-0.624 ** 
(-2.28) 
-0.100 
(-0.28) 
Intercept 2.677 *** 
(4.43) 
- - 
 
Wald chi2 
N 
73.57 *** 
417 
14.18 
417 
58.82 *** 
417 
Note: Dependent variables are Career (1 if SNE came to Commission for career-reasons), International Role 
(SNEs’ acting as “representative of the Commission’; 6-point scale from ‘fully (0) to ‘not at all’ (5)) and 
National Role (SNEs’ acting as “representative of my national government’; 6-point scale from ‘fully (0) 
to ‘not at all’ (5)). In all cases, t statistics based on standard errors corrected for country-level clustering 
between brackets, *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% and ‡at 15%. Wald Chi2 attests to the joint 
significance of all variables in the model. 
